

Message Text

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S E C R E T STATE 183817

EXDIS MILITARY ADDRESS HANDLE AS SPCAT EXCLUSIVE

FOLLOWING BELGRADE 5168 SENT ACTION SECSTATE JULY 30, 1977
REPEATED TO YOU QUOTE

S E C R E T BELGRADE 5163

EXDIS

FOR GELB FROM EAGLEBURGER

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PFOR, MASS, YO
SUBJECT: ARMS TRANSFER POLICIES TOWARDS YUGOSLAVIA

REFS: (A) STATE 169695, (B) BELGRADE 4316

1. APPRECIATE OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT ON FIRST RATE DRAFT.
RECOMMEND THAT SOME AREAS BE HIGHLIGHTED, SOME BE CLARIFIED,
AND THAT SOME QUESTIONS BE ANSWERED MORE FULLY. FOLLOWING ARE
MY COMMENTS:
GENERAL.

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2. WHILE THE BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM IS WELL STATED,
THE DRAFT DOES NOT EXPLAIN CLEARLY WHY WE DESIRE A
NEW MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE GOY. TO THIS END,
DRAFT SHOULD STRESS THAT IN THE POST-TITO PERIOD, THE
YUGOSLAV MILITARY AND THE LEAGUE OF COMMUNISTS WILL
BE THE TWO MOST IMPORTANT INSTITUTIONS IN THE COUNTRY.
THEY VERY LIKELY TO DETERMINE HOW THE GOVERNMENT IS RUN
AND WHICH POLICIES WILL BE FOLLOWED. YET AT PRESENT, OUR
HIGH LEVEL CONTACTS WITH THE LCY AND THE MILITARY ARE
SLIM AND OUR INFLUENCE WITH THEM EVEN SLIMMER.

3. A NEW ARMS TRANSFER POLICY TOWARD YUGOSLAVIA SHOULD HELP TO ELIMINATE SOME OF THE DISTANCE BETWEEN US AND THE YUGOSLAV MILITARY. AS WE BEGIN TO REESTABLISH THE KIND OF WORKING RELATIONSHIP WE HAVE NOT HAD SINCE THE 1950'S, OUR CONTACTS SHOULD INCREASE. TO THE EXTENT THE GOY ATTEMPTS TO PERPETUATE THE PRESENT GROUND RULES, WHICH SEVERELY RESTRICT OUR ACCESS, WE MUST MAKE CLEAR THAT THIS WILL NOT WORK AND THAT THERE MUST BE DIRECT ACCESS TO THE LEVELS IN THE YUGOSLAV MILITARY NECESSARY TO ACCOMPLISH THE JOB.

4. THE DRAFT FOCUSES TOO MUCH ON THE SOVIETS, OVER-EMPHASIZES THEIR DIRECT MILITARY THREAT, AND OMITTS CONSIDERATION OF OTHER POSSIBILITIES INCLUDING THREATS THE YUGOSLAVS THEMSELVES PERCEIVE. I CERTAINLY AGREE THAT IF THERE WERE TO BE AGGRESSION DIRECTED AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA, IT WOULD BE SOVIET AND NOT WESTERN INSPIRED. BUT HIGHLIGHTING ONLY THIS POSSIBILITY LEAVES THE UNINITIATED READER A FALSE IMPRESSION OF DANGERS YUGOSLAVIA COULD FACE WHEN TITO DEPARTS.

5. ONE SERIOUS SOURCE OF INSTABILITY ARISES FROM THE
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NATIONALITY QUESTION. THE YUGOSLAV MILITARY, AS ONE OF THE TWO POWERFUL ALL-YUGOSLAV ENTITIES, WOULD BE INSTRUMENTAL IN MAINTAINING THE UNITY OF THE COUNTRY. IT IS ALREADY PROBABLY THE MOST "YUGOSLAV" INSTITUTION EXTAUT, AND IS EVEN MORE COHESIVE THAN THE PARTY.

6. ADDITIONALLY, WE SHOULD RECALL THAT IN APRIL 1974 (BEFORE THE OSIMO SETTLEMENT OF THE TRIESTE QUESTION) THE YUGOSLAV MILITARY MOBILIZED TROOPS NEAR ITS WESTERN BORDER IN RESPONSE TO A MILITARY EXERCISE BEING CONDUCTED IN ITALY. WHILE WE KNOW THAT NATO WOULD NOT ATTACK YUGOSLAVIA, SOME YUGOSLAVS BELIEVE THAT IN THE EVENT OF CONFLICT WITHIN THE COUNTRY, NATO NATIONS WOULD NOT MIND SNATCHING OFF SLOVENIA, THE DALMATIAN COAST, AND OTHER PARTS OF CROATIA. THIS IS A YUGOSLAV PERCEPTION. ANOTHER IS THEIR BELIEF THAT BY NOT SUPPRESSING HOSTILE YUGOSLAV EMIGRE GROUPS, WESTERN NATIONS IN EFFECT ARE ENCOURAGING THEIR DEVELOPMENT AND ACTIVITIES, AND THEREFORE CONTRIBUTING TO NATIONAL EXTREMISM AND POSSIBLE VIOLENCE IN YUGOSLAVIA.

7. ACCORDINGLY, THE DRAFT SHOULD MAKE REFERENCE TO THESE OTHER YUGOSLAV FEARS. WE ARE OFTEN INCLINED TO ATTRIBUTE SOME OF THEM TO YUGOSLAV PARANOIA, BUT THEY EXIST AND CANNOT BE DISMISSED. DRAFT SHOULD THEREFORE, MENTION THAT AN EXPANDED ARMS SALES POLICY WILL BY ITS VERY NATURE LESSEN YUGOSLAV APPREHENSIONS ABOUT WESTERN NATIONS

COVETING YUGOSLAV TERRITORY AND SUPPORTING NATIONALIST SEPARATISM. IT WOULD THEREBY WEAKEN THE ARGUMENT OF THOSE YUGOSLAVS WHO BELIEVE COUNTRY MUST RETURN TO THE SOVIET-FOLD TO RETAIN ITS TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND SOCIALIST SYSTEM.

8 THE DRAFT ALSO NEEDS SOME SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION OF THE US-YUGOSLAV RELATIONSHIP. SPECIFICALLY, THE TEXT MAKES THE DECLARATION (BUT DOES SAY WHY) THE "EMBARGO ON FURTHER
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MILITARY SALES...RUNS SO CLEARLY AGAINST THE GRAIN OF OUR INTERESTS IN YUGOSLAVIA". BELIEVE THIS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED BOTH IN THE TEXT AND AS A FORMAL OPTION. WHILE WE COME DOWN STRONGLY ON SIDE OF INCREASED SALES, THE NO SALES OPTION IS WORTHY OF CONSIDERATION, AND BELIEVE POLITICAL RATIONALE FOR CONTACT WITH YUGOSLAV MILITARY WILL STAND OUT IN SHARPER FOCUS IF OPTION IS PRESENTED. AS NOW SITUATED, THE DISMISSAL OF THE "EMBARGO" OPTION DENIGRATES WHAT IS OTHERWISE A CONSIDERED TREATMENT OF ALL THE POSSIBILITIES.

9. THE TANK DIVERSION CASE SHOULD ALSO BE TAKEN HEAD ON. AS WE STATED IN REF B, IT UNDERLINES THE COMPLEXITY OF THE US-YUGOSLAV RELATIONSHIP -- A MIXTURE OF CONFLICTING AND COMMON CONCERNS. ON ONE HAND GOY DOES MUCH IN THIRD WORLD AND ELSEWHERE THAT CONFLICTS WITH OUR POLICIES. ON OTHER HAND YUGOSLAVIA SITS ASTRIDE THE SENSITIVE AND STRATEGIC DIVIDING LINE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST IN EUROPE; ITS SECURITY AND INDEPENDENCE ARE IMPORTANT TO US. NOTHING WE CAN DO WILL MORE STRENGTHEN ITS WILL TO RESIST SOVIET PRESSURES TO LIMIT THAT INDEPENDENCE THAN AN EXPANDING MILITARY RELATIONSHIP.

10. IT ALSO IMPORTANT TO INCLUDE LINKAGE BETWEEN AN IMPROVED MILITARY-TO-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH YUGOSLAVIA AND THE NEW ADMINISTRATION'S CLEAR INTEREST IN IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH NON-ALIGNED AS A WHOLE. YUGOSLAVIA IS ONE OF THE 2-3 MOST ACTIVE AND INFLUENTIAL NAM MEMBERS. OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP DOES NOT DETERMINE YUGOSLAV STANDS IN MULTILATERAL FORA, BUT IT HAS AN IMPACT. ALSO, AS WE STRENGTHEN RELATIONSHIP WITH GOY WE ALSO DO SO (AT/EAST TO SOME DEGREE) WITH NAM.

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11. NAVY -- THE DRAFT TAKES LITTLE ACCOUNT OF THE YUGOSLAV NAVY. WHERE IT DOES (PARA 17), IT SUGGESTS THAT THE ONLY NAVAL THREAT MAY BE PERCEIVED BY THE YUGOSLAVS TO COME FROM THE WEST. IT IS A VALID GENERAL

POINT (WHICH SHOULD BE MADE) THAT WE CANNOT BE ENTIRELY CERTAIN THAT YUGOSLAV WEAPONS WOULD NEVER BE USED AGAINST WEST. BUT THIS IS NO MORE TRUE OF NAVAL THAN ARMY OR AF MATERIAL, AND YUGOSLAV FORCES ARE SO HEAVILY DEFENSIVE IN NATURE THAT QUESTION IS SUBSTANTIALLY ACADEMIC. PRESENT FORMULATION IN DRAFT SEEMS TO US TO DISCRIMINATE AGAINST NAVAL COOPERATION, WHICH WE VERY MUCH FAVOR (AS DEPARTMENT AWARE, YUGOSLAVS DESIRE TO PURCHASE THE HARPOON MISSILE AND OTHER NAVAL EQUIPMENT). IN FACT, M-44 TORPEDO COULD WELL BE FIRST MAJOR ITEM ACTUALLY TRANSFERRED SINCE 1950'S AND THIS IS OF GREAT SYMBOLIC-POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE.

SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON REFTEL TEXT:

12. PARA 4 -- 'EXTRANEIOUS EVENTS' HAVE NOT BEEN THE ONLY CAUSE OF OUR UNDERDEVELOPED ARMS TRANSFER RELATIONSHIP. BOTH SIDES -- THE YUGOSLAVS, FROM SUSPICION OF U.S. MOTIVIES, EXCESSIVE SECRETIVENESS, AND BUREAUCRATIC CONFUSION; AND THE U.S., FROM SUSPICIONS ABOUT GOY AND DELAYS IN RESPONDING -- MUST SHARE THE BLAME.

13. PARA 11 -- IN RECENT YEARS THE GOY HAS NOT PURCHASED (OR BEEN PERMITTED TO PURCHASE) ANY MAJOR WESPONS SYSTEM OR MAJOR PIECE OF EQUIPMENT FROM THE WEST. BLUNTLY PUT, YUGOSLAV TANKS, COMBAT AIRCRAFT (THE ORAO IS STILL IN THE FUTURE AND WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR 1-2 YEARS), SAM'S, ETC. ARE SOVIET. FURTHERMORE, THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT THE GOY IS CONSIDERING THE PURCHASE OF ADDITIONAL SOVIET WEAPONS IN ABSENCE OF WESTERN RESPONSIVENESS TO THEIR APPEALS. WHEN YOU ADD ALL THIS TOGETHER, YOU BEGIN TO APPRECIATE THE POTENTIALL LARGE AMOUNT OF SOVIET CONTACT WITH AND INFLUENCE ON THE YUGOSLAV MILITARY. THE GOY MAY BE SEEKING BROADER

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SOURCES OF SUPPLY, BUT IF RESTRICTED ELSEWHERE MUST RETURN TO THE SOVIETS. (AN ECONOMIC CONSIDERATION NOT TO BE DISMISSED IS THE ATTRACTION OF SOFT CURRENCY PURCHASES AND LOWER PRICES FROM THE USSR AS OPPOSED TO U.S. HARD CURRENCY DEMANDS). IT ALSO SHOULD BE NOTED HERE THAT THE GOY DOES NOT HAVE TO BE CONVINCED OF THE NEED TO DEVELOP A DOMESTIC PRODUCTION BASE. DOMESTIC INDUSTRIES ALREADY PRODUCE AT LEAST 65 (AND ACCORDING TO SOME YUGOSLAVS PERHAPS AS MUCH AS 85) PERCENT OF YUGOSLAV OVERALL MILITARY NEEDS. THE GREATEST WEAKNESS IN THIS AREA IS THEIR LACK OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY CAPABILITY.

14. PARA 13 -- IT IS PARTICULARLY HERE WHERE THE SOVIET ASPECT IS OVERDONE AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS I HAVE ALREADY MENTIONED OMITTED.

15. PARA 15 -- WE HAVE BEEN SUGGESTING THE IMMINENCE OF 'TITO'S DEPARTURE' FOR YEARS, BUT HE CONTNUES TO

OUTLIVE US ALL. THIS PORTION SHOULD BE REDRAFTED
TO STATE THAT EVEN IF HE IS TO LIVE FOR SOME TIME, IT WOULD
STILL BE IN OUR INTEREST NOW --WITH AN EYE TO THE FUTURE--
TO BEGIN STRENGTHENING OUR TIES WITH THE YUGOSLAV MILITARY.

16. PARA 16 --THE LAST SENTENCE IS CORRECT AND THE
THOUGHT IT EXPRESSES SHOULD BE EXPANDED. MILITARY COOPERATION IN
GENERAL AND SOPHISTICATED TECHNOLOGY IN PARTICULAR IS NEEDED
NOT SO MUCH TO GIVE THE YUGOSLAVS THE CAPACITY TO STAND AND FIGHT
THE SOVIETS IN A MODERN WAR (A CAPACITY THEY WILL NEVER HAVE),
BUT FOR ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT ON THEIR WILL TO RESIST
SOVIET PRESSURES IN WAR AND IN A SITUATION SHORT OF WAR. IT ALSO
HAS DETERRENT VALUE IN THAT MOBILIZATION OF MILLIONS OF
YUGOSLAVS TO FIGHT MOUNTAIN-GUERILLA WARFARE GOY CAN
AND WOULD CONDUCT AGAINST SOVIETS DEPENDS ON SEVERAL DAYS
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OF DELAYING TACTICS AGAINST LARGE UNITS. THIS IN TURN DEPENDS
ON THE KNOWLEDGE AND CONFIDENCE THAT THE GOY POSSESSES
THE MATERIAL TO EFFECT THESE HOLDING ACTIONS LONG ENOUGH.

17. PARA 17, FIRST SUBPARAGRAPH -- IT IS CORRECT TO
STATE THAT HONORED REQUESTS COULD LEAD TO MORE AMBITIOUS
DEMANDS. BESIDE EXPANDED SALES, THE GOY SUBSEQUENTLY COULD
OPT FOR MORE ACTION LIKE COMPONENT CONSTRUCTION LICENSING,
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY (WHICH DEFSEC LJUBICIC ALREADY
MENTIONED TO ADMIRAL HOLLOWAY). A NOTE OF CAUTION ON THIS
POINT SHOULD BE ADDED TO THE TEXT.

18. PARA 17, THIRD SUBPARAGRAPH -- I BELIEVE IT IS
UNLIKELY THE SOVIETS WOULD IMPAIR THEIR RELATIONS WITH
US OVER AN EXPANDED US-YUGOSLAV MILITARY RELATIONSHIP.
I ALSO FEEL THEY HAVE TOO MUCH AT STAKE IN YUGOSLAVIA
TO TAKE THE STEPS SUGGESTED IN THIS SECTION.

19. REMAINDER OF PARA 17 --THERE IS HIGH TECHNOLOGY
EQUIPMENT ALREADY IN THE AREA (WE HAVE IDENTIFIED SEVERAL
SOVIET-PRODUCED SURFACE TO AIR MISSILES IN YUGOSLAVIA,
INCLUDING THE SA-6 AND SA-9). THUS, THE INTRODUCTION OF
ANY OF THE SYSTEMS WE ARE CONSIDERING WOULD NOT RAISE THE ANTE
LOCALLY. BESIDES, BOTH THE WEAPONS THEY ARE INTERESTED IN AND
YUGOSLAV MILITARY ORIENTATION ARE DEFENSIVE IN NATURE AND
SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS INCREASED DETERRENTS RATHER THAN
CREATORS OF HIGHER OFFENSIVE CAMBAT CAPABILITY.

20. PARA 18, SECOND SUBPARAGRAPH -- HERE TOO I BELIEVE
THE SOVIET ASPECT IS OVERDONE AND SHOULD BE CUT BACK
CONSIDERABLY. SUGGESTING THE AMOUNT OF SOVIET CONCERN
IMPLIED IN THE PARAGRAPH OVER-SIMPLIFIES THE CASE.

21. PARA 18, THIRD SUBPARAGRAPH -- CHANGE "BOLSTERING
YUGOSLAV INDEPENDENCE" TO SOMETHING ON THE ORDER OF "BOLSTERING

YUGOSLAV ABILITY (A/O DESIRE) TO REMAIN INDEPENDENT."

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2. PARA 19 -- I AGREE WITH NEED FOR CONSULTATIONS TO ENCOURAGE NATO ALLIES TO EXPAND THEIR NOW ALMOST NON-EXISTENT BILATERAL MILITARY COOPERATION WITH YUGOSLAVIA. BUT THIS SHOULD BE DONE WITH DISCRETION AND WITH OUR OWN INTERESTS FIRST IN MIND. RESULT OF THE EXPANDED RELATIONSHIP SHOULD BE GREATER AMERICAN NOT GREATER FRENCH INFLUENCES. THE YUGOSLAVS SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT GREATER WESTERN RESPONSIVENESS IS, IN GREAT PART, DUE TO U.S. ENCOURAGEMENT. WE MUST AT THE SAME TIME, BE CAREFUL TO GUARD AGAINST PUBLICITY ON NATO DISCUSSIONS OF THEN SUBJECT. YUGOSLAV' WOULD INEVITABLY REACT BADLY THEREBY BLOWING THE WHOLE DEAL.

23. PARA 21 (OPTION I) -- THE DRAFT SHOULD STATE EXPLICITLY AND VIGOROUSLY THAT CASE-BY-CASE APPROACH DESCRIBED BY OPTION I HAS FAILED -- AFTER FOUR YEARS WE ARE IF ANYTHING AT AN EVEN LOWER LEVEL OF MILITARY COOPERATION THAN THE ALREADY NEAR ZERO LEVEL OF THE EARLY 1970'S. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF TOW, WE HAVE TURNED DOWN ALL REQUESTS FOR WEAPONS IN WHICH YUGOSLAVS EXPRESSED REAL INTEREST (EVEN THOUGH THEY HAVE TENDED TO SHOOT FOR THE MOON OR NOTHING). WHAT IS NEEDED IS A GENERAL CHANGE OF ATTITUDE ON BOTH SIDES. WITH THE SIGNS OF STRONG YUGOSLAV INTEREST, MUCH NOW DEPENDS ON US, AND THE PARAGRAPH SHOULD REFLECT THIS.

24. PARA 23 (OPTION III) -- THE DRAFT SHOULD STATE WITHOUT RESERVATION THAT THE GOY WOULD NOT ACCEPT SUCH AN ANTI-SOVIET APPROACH IF COMMUNICATED AS SUCH; TOW CASE SHOULD HAVE TAUGHT US THIS LESSON. THEY WILL SUSPECT WE TRYING TO DERAIL THEIR RELATIONS WITH SOVIETS -- FROM WHOM THEY GET A GREAT DEAL -- FOR LITTLE RETURN OR AT COST
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OF THEIR NON-ALIGNED STATUS. AT SAME TIME, BELIEVE WE SHOULD COMBINE ONE ELEMENT OF OPTION III WITH OPTION II AS PREFERRED COURSE, I.E. THAT WE SHOULD DEFINE FOR OURSELVES WHAT GOY NEEDS ARE TO DEFEND AGAINST SOVIETS AND TAKE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE TO THEM SPECIFIC ITEMS TO MEET THESE NEEDS -- WHILE NEVER MENTIONING SOVIET UNION. THIS WOULD BE DISTINCT IMPROVEMENT OVER OUR PRESENT STANCE, BOTH IN TERMS OF FORTHCOMINGNESS AND AVOIDING THE SALE OF ITEMS THEY REALLY DO NOT NEED.

25. UNDER OPTION III "CONS", IT SHOULD BE STATED THAT WE ARE NOT CERTAIN THE GOY WOULD BE INTERESTED IN PURCHASING THE ENTIRE RANGE OF EQUIPMENT OFFERED UNDER

THIS OPTION. ADDITIONALLY, IT IS NOT AS EVIDENT AS THE SECOND SUBPARAGRAPH DECLARES THAT THE YUGOSLAVS WOULD WANT FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE -- THOUGH IT IS CLEAR THEY THINK WE HAVE MORE PRICE FLEXIBILITY THAN WE HAVE. AF CMDR GENERAL CEMALOVIC TOLD DATT THAT YUGOSLAVIA, WHILE NOT RICH, CAN AFFORD TO PAY FOR WHAT IT PURCHASES. THIS WOULD SUGGEST THAT THE GOY MIGHT ESCHEW CREDIT PURCHASES. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE YUGOSLAVS ARE NOT AWARE THAT AN OPTION OFFERING MUCH MORE THAN THEY HAVE REQUESTED IS BEING CONSIDERED WITHIN THE USG.

26. TRAINING -- THE DRAFT SHOULD ADDRESS MILITARY TRAINING, SINCE IT IS SO CLOSELY RELATED TO ARMS TRANSFERS (AND SUCH OTHER KEY INGREDIENTS FOR AN IMPROVED MILITARY RELATIONSHIP AS HIGH-LEVEL VISITS AND SHIP REPAIRS SHOULD ALSO BE MENTIONED AT LEAST IN PASSING). IN THE FIRST PLACE, TRAINING OF PERSONNEL TO HANDLE AND MAINTAIN ANY NEW SYSTEM SOLD COULD BE A LARGE PROGRAM. AS FOR PROGRAMS UNCONNECTED WITH SALES, CEMALOVIC ALSO STATED THAT THEY ARE HIGHLY INTERESTED IN USAF TECHNICAL TRAINING. I GATHER THE YUGOSLAV NAVY IS PREPARING AN OFFICER FOR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE FOR SOME TIME IN THE NEXT YEAR OR SO. THIS IS BUT A PITTANCE COMPARED WITH WHAT COULD BE POSSIBLE IF THE COSTS
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TO THEM WERE NOT SO HIGH. THE YUGOSLAVS PRESSED THIS POINT ON GENERAL WILSON (OF DIA) EARLIER THIS MONTH. I BELIEVE WE SHOULD TRY TO SEEK AN EXCEPTION TO THE FUNDING REQUIREMENT IF IT WOULD MEAN MORE YUGOSLAV INVOLVEMENT IN OUR TRAINING PROGRAMS. THE PERSONAL CONTACTS PERHAPS AS MUCH AS THE WEAPONS SALES WOULD PAY LONG TERM DIVIDENDS TOWARDS ENHANCEMENT OF THE RELATIONSHIP.

27. FINALLY, LET US RECALL THAT THE TOW DEAL WAS SCUTTLED BECAUSE OF A LEAKED PRESS ACCOUNT WHICH EMPHASIZED THE ANTI-SOVIET SLANT IN YUGOSLAV INTEREST IN TOW. THE GOY WILL LOSE ALL INTEREST AGAIN IF THE PRESS LEARNS OF OUR STUDY, AS THE STORY CERTAINLY WOULD BE CAST IN AN ANTI-SOVIET MOLD. WHEN THE TIME COMES, THE GOY WILL HAVE TO LIVE WITH THE FACT THAT A NEW ARMS TRANSFER POLICY WILL BE DISCUSSED WITH THE CONGRESS AND CERTAIN SALES REPORTED TO THE CONGRESS. NEVERTHELESS, IT CERTAINLY WOULD BE PREFERABLE FOR ALL OF US IF THE DECLASSIFICATION WERE TO OCCUR WHEN WE ARE READY FOR IT AND NOT WHEN DISCLOSURE WOULD UNDERMINE THE ENTIRE EFFORT -- AS IT CLEARLY WOULD AT PRESENT TIME AND UNTIL SOMETHING CONCRETE HAS BEEN ACHIEVED. EAGLEBURGER
UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

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